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RECENT DEVELOPMENT

MARCANTONIO V. MOEN: AN EXPERT'S AFFIDAVIT
MATERIALLY CONTRADICTS A PRIOR SWORN
STATEMENT ONLY WHEN THERE IS AN
IRRECONCILABLE STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACT.
By: Joseph Maher

The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that an affidavit is a
material contradiction of prior deposition testimony, under Maryland
Rule 5-201(e), when it creates an irreconcilable factual discrepancy of
consequence to the expert's previous sworn statement. Marcantonio v.
Moen, 406 Md. 395, 959 A.2d 764 (2008). Upon finding a material
contradiction, the court may strike the disingenuous affidavit. /d. at
412, 959 A.2d at 774.
In August 2000, Sherri Schaefer ("Schaefer") informed her
gynecologist, Melissa Moen, M.D., ("Dr. Moen") that she was
experiencing abnormal vaginal bleeding. The next month, Dr. Moen
performed an ultrasound; however, she did not perform a biopsy at this
time. Paula DeCandido, M.D., ("Dr. DeCandido") interpreted the
ultrasound. Dr. DeCandido failed to report a 1.5 centimeter mass
located on Schaefer's right ovary. Continuing to experience physical
ailments, Schaefer returned to Dr. Moen and underwent a biopsy in
April 2001. Schaefer was diagnosed with cancer and received
treatment until her death on May 18, 2005.

Prior to her death, Schaefer and her husband, Charles Marcantonio
("Marcantonio"), filed a claim in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel
County against Drs. Moen and DeCandido ("Medical Providers") for
negligently failing to diagnose and treat Schaefer's cancer in 2000.
After Schaefer's death, Marcantonio added wrongful death and
survivorship claims against the Medical Providers in an amended
complaint.
Two expert witnesses for Marcantonio were deposed. The first
expert, Dr. Hutchins, testified that he reasonably believed that Dr.
Moen departed from the applicable standard of care, but he would not
render an opinion as to the cause of Schaefer's death. In a subsequent
affidavit, Dr. Hutchins rendered an opinion, within a reasonable
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degree of medical probability, that Dr. Moen's failure to diagnose
Schaefer's condition in 2000 was the proximate cause of her death.
Dr. Shmookler, Marcantonio's second expert, testified in his
deposition that he did not have an opinion of the staging or prognosis
of Schaefer's cancer, within a reasonable degree of medical
probability, during May and July 2001. However, in a subsequent
affidavit, Dr. Shmookler stated that the failure to properly diagnose the
ovarian tumor in September 2000 was a substantial factor which
proximately caused Schaefer's death.
The Medical Providers filed a motion to strike the affidavits of Drs.
Hutchins and Shmookler. The circuit court granted the motion on the
basis that the affidavits materially contradicted the prior deposition
testimony of the experts, in violation of Maryland Rule 2-501(e)
("Rule 2-501(e)"). As a result, the circuit court granted summary
On appeal by
judgment in favor of the Medical Providers.
Marcantonio, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed.
Marcantonio petitioned for a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals
of Maryland, and the court granted the petition.
In its analysis, the Court of Appeals of Maryland determined under
what circumstances, pursuant to Rule 2-501(e), an affidavit materially
contradicts an expert's prior deposition testimony. Marcantonio, 406
Md. 405 n.8, 959 A.2d at 769 n.8. The Medical Providers argued that
the plain language of Rule 2-501(e) requires its application to any
contradiction found in an affidavit which conflicts with a prior sworn
statement. Id. at 407-08, 959 A.2d at 771. In contrast, Marcantonio
argued that Rule 2-501(e) only applies to contradictions of material
fact between deposition testimony and an affidavit. ld. at 409, 959
A.2d at 772.
In a prior case, the Court of Appeals of Maryland decided that the
sham affidavit rule did not mesh with Maryland law because it shifts
the determination of credibility from the trier of fact to the judge on
summary judgment. Id. at 407, 959 A.2d at 771 (citing Pittman v. At/.
Realty, 359 Md. 513, 540-42, 754 A.2d 1030, 1041 (2000)). The sham
affidavit rule, which has been adopted by every federal circuit,
provides the trial court with discretion to disregard an affidavit that
materially contradicts prior sworn testimony when afforded no
explanation. Marcantonio, 406 Md. at 405, 959 A.2d at 770 (citing
Pittman, 359 Md. at 529, 754 A.2d at 1038). Subsequently, in 2003,
the Rules Committee examined the issue of sham affidavits and
recommended that a subsection be added to Rule 2-501. Marcantonio,
406 Md. at 407, 959 A.2d at 771. The Court of Appeals of Maryland
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accepted the Rules Committee's recommendation to include
subsection (e), which now reads in pertinent part, that "[i]f the court
finds that an affidavit or other statement under oath materially
contradicts the prior sworn statement, the court shall strike the
contradictory part." !d. (citing Md. Rule 2-501(e)).
The rule does not define "material contradiction" so the court
examined the ordinary meaning of the words. Marcantonio, 406 Md.
at 409, 959 A.2d at 772. The court explained that a "material
contradiction," under Rule 5-201(e), occurs when a statement is
"irreconcilable" to the affiant's prior sworn statement because a
factual assertion is "significantly opposite." !d. at 410, 959 A.2d at
773. The court provided an example involving an individual's
exposure to lead paint where the deposition provided a specific time
period; however, the later affidavit set forth a different length of time.
!d. at 406, 410, 959 A.2d at 770-71, 773 (citing Pittman, 359 Md. at
518, 523-26, 754 A.2d at 1032, 1035-37). There was a clear material
contradiction of the amount of time because both statements could not
be true; therefore, the court may properly strike an affidavit under such
a circumstance. Marcantonio, 406 Md. at 410, 959 A.2d at 773.
In comparison, the court looked to the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals for an example of what is not considered a material
contradiction. !d. at 411, 959 A.2d at 773 (citing Hinch v. Lucy Webb
Hayes Nat. Training, 814 A.2d 926 (D.C. 2003)). In that case, the
initial deposition stated that the expert could not "tease apart" the
exact cause of the plaintiffs injury from the several possible causes;
however, the affidavit stated, to a reasonable degree of medical
certainty, that the defendant's negligence caused the plaintiffs
injuries. Marcantonio, 406 Md. at 411, 959 A.2d at 773 (citing Hinch,
814 A.2d at 931 ). The court held that this did not constitute a "clear
and explicit contradiction." Marcantonio, 406 Md. at 411, 959 A.2d at
773-74 (citing Hinch, 814 A.2d at 931).
The Court of Appeals of Maryland continued to cement its
definition of a material contradiction through rulings of other
jurisdictions and the purpose of the Maryland summary judgment
procedure. Marcantonio, 406 Md. at 411-12, 959 A.2d at 774. Upon
this justified definition, the court held that the affidavits of Drs.
Hutchins and Shmookler did not materially contradict their prior
deposition testimonies. !d. at 413-14, 959 A.2d at 775. Dr. Hutchins'
affidavit was viewed to supplement his deposition, demonstrating a
change in intention and not a factual contraction. !d. at 413, 959 A.2d
at 774-75. Dr. Shmookler's affidavit was deemed to be, at best, a
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credibility issue and not an issue of fact. !d. at 414, 959 A.2d at 775.
The absence of an opinion as to Schaefer's prognosis or staging did
not prohibit Dr. Shmookler from making an opinion pertaining to the
failure of the treating physician's diagnosis of the tumor. !d.
While the court clearly elucidates the definition of a "material
contradiction" under Maryland Rule 2-50l(e), the court's
interpretation in this matter greatly affects the current practitioner in
his approach to depositions and summary judgment proceedings. This
ruling allows an expert to give vague and indirect answers in the early
stages of a lawsuit to avoid claims of summary judgment. Although
this approach to the discovery process may in some ways affect
judicial economy, it promotes justice by focusing summary judgment
only on material facts, not on the existence of mere contradiction or
witness credibility.

